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CCAFS – CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security  
DISCOMs – Electricity distribution companies 
GHG – Greenhouse gas 
hp – Horsepower 
ITP – IWMI-Tata Water Policy Research Program 
IWMI – International Water Management Institute 
KUSUM – Kisan Urja Shakti evam Utthan Mahabhiyan 
NGO – Not-for-profit organization 
ROI – Return on investment 
SIP – Stochastic information package 
SPaRC – Solar power as a remunerative crop 
 
Glossary of terms 
 
Decision analysis – Decision analysis is a normative method for selecting among actions that have 
uncertain outcomes. This outcome uncertainty can be characterized by probability distributions for 
variables that represent the key consequences of the considered actions. 
Monte Carlo simulation – Monte Carlo simulation performs risk analysis by building models of 
possible results by substituting a range of values – a probability distribution – for any factor that has 
inherent uncertainty. It then calculates results repeatedly, each time using a different set of random 
values from the probability functions. 
SIPmathTM – An open standard that codifies the storage of an uncertainty as a stochastic information 
packet (SIP), an unambiguous data array with provenance. 
Solar power as a remunerative crop (SPaRC) – Approaches by which farmers are able to earn money 
by selling solar power back to the grid. 
Stochastic – Having a probability distribution or random pattern that may be analyzed statistically 
but may not be predicted precisely. 
Stochastic information packet (SIP) – An array of possible outcomes of some uncertainty. 




As part of an Outcome Evaluation of Climate-Smart Research on Solar-Powered Irrigation in India, a 
simulation model was constructed with the objective of developing a scenario-building model of the 
main factors influencing adoption, major costs, benefits and risks associated with solar-powered 
irrigation. The main focus of the evaluation was on the solar power as a remunerative crop (SPaRC) 
model, also known as KUSUM-C under the multibillion-dollar Kisan Urja Shakti evam Utthan 
Mahabhiyan (KUSUM) initiative of the Government of India. The main objectives of the simulation 
modeling component were to: (i) project income and environmental benefits of the SPaRC scheme 
over the next 20 years; (ii) identify variables to which benefits are particularly sensitive; (iii) run 
scenario analysis for different values of sensitive variables; (iv) pinpoint what further research or 
actions could help to enhance adoption and outcomes, and what variables should be closely 
monitored; and (v) provide a learning tool that can be used to compare what actually happens with 
projections over time and can be continuously updated. 
  
A decision analysis approach is taken, which is designed to cope with improving decisions under 
conditions of large uncertainty and limited data. The analysis is a probabilistic risk-return approach 
that quantifies the current state of uncertainty, including the costs, benefits and risks associated with 
a proposed intervention. The model is used to help answer evaluation questions tackled in the main 
report. All variables in the model are represented as probability distributions to reflect the current 
state of uncertainty in knowledge. The distributions are constructed based on data from available 
literature and reports, where available, and through elicitation from subject matter experts. Monte 
Carlo simulation is used to propagate the uncertainties through to the outcome variables. Different 
policy-relevant scenarios were simulated by changing the input values of key variables. A dashboard 
is provided that allows users to interactively change values and view the effect on outcomes. 
 
Simulations of incremental benefits to 2040, compared with non-solar alternatives, are made for 
KUSUM-C and a competitor model, KUSUM-A, which provides farmers with direct power for irrigation 
from substation-level solar power plants. The simulations are made for Gujarat State only in this 
report, but the model can be parameterized with input data for other states. 
Using the baseline assumptions, by 2040, KUSUM-C increased discounted net income at farm level by 
USD 13,000 (expected value) with a chance of income loss at farm level of 5%. There are significant 
upside opportunities for high levels of farm income in KUSUM-C. At farm level, KUSUM-C reduced 
water use by 14,300 m3/yr. The equivalent increase in farm net income in KUSUM-A was only USD 
1,000 but with no chance of loss. Farm water use increased in KUSUM-A by 40,000 m3/yr.  
The baseline simulations project about 1 million farm households (expected value) will have adopted 
solar-powered irrigation by 2040, made up of 61% KUSUM-C and 39% KUSUM-A and 97% of these will 
have benefited from increased income. Electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs) plus local 
government are projected to generate a net discounted income of USD 1,000 million in KUSUM-C with 
a 27% chance of loss, compared with a loss of USD 60 million in KUSUM-A with a 67% chance of loss. 
At a project level, discounted benefits from reduction in greenhouse gas emissions were USD 
1,030,000 million (expected value) in KUSUM-C compared with USD 310,000 million in KUSUM-A.  
The results are sensitive to adoption rates, which are highly uncertain. The benefits of KUSUM-C are 
strongly dependent on maintaining subsidies and loans to farmers, maintaining tariff rates for sale of 
solar power back to the grid, and on strong local community and supporting organizations. 
 
A number of priorities are identified for further research and monitoring, targeted at areas of greatest 
uncertainty and largest effect on outcomes. Recommendations are given for further application, 




The simulation modeling component is in support of the Outcome Evaluation of Climate-Smart 
Research on Solar-Powered Irrigation in India (see main report). The objective was to develop a 
scenario-building model of the main factors influencing adoption, major costs, benefits and risks 
associated with solar-powered irrigation, with a special focus on the solar power as a remunerative 
crop (SPaRC) model, also known as KUSUM-C under the multibillion-dollar Kisan Urja Shakti evam 
Utthan Mahabhiyan (KUSUM) initiative of the Government of India. The main objectives were to: (i) 
project income and environmental benefits of the SPaRC scheme over the next 20 years (evaluation 
question 5); (ii) identify variables to which benefits are particularly sensitive; (iii) run scenario analysis 
for different values of sensitive variables; (iv) help pinpoint what further research or actions could 
help to enhance adoption and outcomes, and what variables should be closely monitored; and (v) 
provide a learning tool that can be used to compare what actually happens with projections over time 
and can be continuously updated.  
 
The overall modeling approach and main results are described in this report and the model details are 







A decision analysis approach is taken, which is designed to cope with improving decisions under 
conditions of large uncertainty and limited data (Howard and Abbas 2015). The analysis is a 
probabilistic risk-return approach (Luedeling and Shepherd 2016) that quantifies the current state of 
uncertainty, including the costs, benefits and risks associated with a proposed intervention (Fenton 
and Neil 2018). The modeling approach (Table 1) is helpful in projecting potential impacts in relation 
to CGIAR intermediate and system-level outcomes. This decision analysis approach is designed to 
provide insights even in data-limited environments by taking a causal approach, representing 
uncertainty and incorporating expert knowledge (Fenton and Neil 2018). Sensitivity analysis is used to 
help identify what further research or actions could help to enhance adoption and outcomes, and 
what variables should be closely monitored. In this case, the model was built in Microsoft Excel using 
freely available tools. To improve the communication of results to researchers and stakeholders, a 
simulation dashboard was provided that allows interactive simulation of the influence of key policy 




The model was built to help answer evaluation questions tackled in the main report. All variables in 
the model were represented as probability distributions to reflect the current state of uncertainty in 
knowledge. The distributions were constructed based on data from available literature and reports 
and through elicitation from subject matter experts as described by Luedeling and Shepherd (2016). 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to propagate the uncertainties through to the outcome variables. 






Table 1. Key steps in the simulation modeling approach. There was iteration among the steps. 
Model building 
1. Assemble background information on the intervention from literature and experts. 
2. Define key decisions that the evaluation model may inform. 
3. Specify the main model components and levels of disaggregation to be included, and the 
geographic scope. 
4. Building on the scaling theory informed by ex-post work, assemble a causal model of the main 
factors influencing adoption, major costs, benefits and risks.  
5. Program the model in Microsoft Excel.  
6. Test and embellish the model through individual interviews of experts.  
 
Data assembly 
1. Define data needs and design a data entry template. 
2. Identify key data sources and experts who can provide estimates. 
3. Train experts in subjective probability estimation and elicit estimates.  
4. Fill data entry templates.  
 
Model testing and refinement 
1. Test and review model output with experts. 
2. Make model refinements and check errors 
3. Define scenarios to be modeled.  
 
Model output and interpretation 
1. Run scenarios and sensitivity analysis 
2. Review output with experts and stakeholders, including feedback from two virtual project 
workshops.  
3. Identify key uncertainties, and develop insights into actions that could increase upsides and 
decrease risks. 
4. Document the model, data sources, resources and insights.  
 
Model handover 
1. Identify and train experts in use of the model. 
2. Identify a potential institutional home for hosting the model.  
 
 
Simulations were run in Microsoft Excel using freely-available SIPmathTM tools,1 which allow 
calculations to be done in the same way as single numbers, but behind the scenes the calculations are 
performed on probability distributions, stored as an array of possible outcomes. In the SIPmath 
Standard, uncertainties are communicated as data arrays called SIPs (stochastic information packets). 
For example, the SIP representing the roll of a die would be expressed as thousands of outcomes, 
which can be stored in Excel or a database. 
 
The model input used metalog distributions (Keelin 2016), which are a flexible form of probability 
distribution that allow for easy input from disparate data sources and expert elicitation. Metalogs 
require users to only enter values for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of a variable, and optionally 
upper and lower bounds.  
 
The model used an annual time step from present to 2040 and results were summarized in tabular 
and graphical form. Simulations for scenarios of interest to experts and policy makers were generated 
                                                          
1 SipmathTM Modeller Tools. https://www.probabilitymanagement.org/tools 
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and displayed using a dashboard. The project team members were also able to interactively change 
input values and instantly view the outcomes. 
 
The ranges in the simulated results are subject to the input data ranges used and the assumptions 
included in the model. The model is intended as a learning tool with which to explore likely outcomes 
of different assumptions. 
 
Decision to be modeled 
 
Initially the model was designed to project the adoption and differential impacts of SPaRC (KUSUM-C) 
compared with other forms of non-solar irrigation in all of India. In other words, the decision being 
modeled can be framed as “Is SPaRC a good bet compared with non-solar irrigation considering risks 
and net returns?” However, iterative consultation with experts led to several revisions of the model 
scope as follows: 
 
 Extension of the model to compare KUSUM-C with KUSUM-A, as a competing model. KUSUM-
A is based on substation-level solar power plants that provide farmers with direct solar power 
for irrigation. 
 Consideration in the model of areas that are groundwater limited compared with areas where 
groundwater is non-limiting. 
 Restriction of the model to Gujarat State initially due to the diverse range of conditions in 
different parts of India, and the more plentiful data and experience in Gujarat. However, the 
model structure was made generic and can be parameterized with data for other states as 
required. 
 
Model structure and assumptions 
 
The model structure was refined through iterative consultation with experts (Figure 1). The nested 
levels of aggregation of net benefits included in the model are: (i) farmers; (ii) aggregation of adopting 
farmers; (iii) distribution companies (DISCOMs) and local government; (iv) environmental; and (v) 
project level. 
 
Incremental costs and benefits at farm level are aggregated according to the number of farmers 
adopting solar. The aggregated farm net benefits, the DISCOM and local government net benefits and 
net environmental impact are aggregated to give the overall project net benefit. Environment includes 
costs of water and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
 
The various costs, benefits and risks considered in the model are shown in Table 2 and the more 
detailed list of input variables is given in the next section in Table 3. These were derived from literature 




Figure 1. Overall structure of the simulation model. 
 
 




 Initial investment of solar panel and pump 
 Loan repayment 
 Additional reoccurring costs 
 None 
Farmer benefits 
 Power savings due to more efficient irrigation 
 Savings due to adoption of solar (vs diesel or 
electricity costs) 
 Additional power generation 
 Sale of surplus power/water to neighbors 
 Sale of surplus power to the grid 
 Increase in income due to more 
reliable/convenient power 
 Additional power available 
 Sale of surplus power to neighbors 
Farmer risks 
 Lack of community structure and support 
services impedes adoption 
 Technical problems or theft decrease 
adoption 
 Low solar power tariff or low income reduces 
adoption 
 Overpumping increases water-pumping costs 
 Lack of incentive to maintain feeders reduces 
benefit of reliable power 
 Power rationing by DISCOMs reduces income 
 Overpumping increases water costs 
 Farmers’ negative perception of DISCOMs 
reduces adoption 
Adoption enablers 
 High solar power tariff accelerates adoption 
 Promotion multiplier (communication, 
demonstration, policy) 
 Financing multiplier (private sector 
aggregators/government incentives) 
 Promotion multiplier (communication, 
demonstration, policy) 
 Financing multiplier (private sector 
aggregators/government incentives) 
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DISCOM + local government costs 
 Capital costs (subsidies) 
 Execution costs 
 Increase in supply cost due to extra 
consumption by farmers 
 Execution costs 
DISCOM + local government benefits 
 Cost saving from solar power purchased 
 Savings from farmers taken off the grid 
 Reduction in losses 
 Reduced cost of supplying electricity due to 
solar adoption 
  
DISCOM + local government risks 
 None  Lack of land availability for solar plants 
reduces adoption 
Environment 
 Additional water use 
 Reduced GHG emissions from solar vs fossil 
fuel power generation 
 Additional water use 
 Reduced GHG emissions from solar vs fossil 
fuel power generation 
 
 
The target population of farmers is the number of farmers in the region of interest that have the 
potential to adopt solar irrigation. Adoption (Figure 2) is modeled using a Bass model,2 which has been 
widely used to model technology adoption in industry, including photovoltaic systems. The Bass model 
has two parameters: the ‘p’ parameter determines the initial rate of adoption by ‘innovators’ and the 
‘q’ parameter determines the subsequent adoption by ‘imitators’. The Bass model determines the 
fraction of the target population that adopts each year. Its parameters are modified by various risk 
and enabling factors.  
 
Figure 2. Overview of the model adoption component. The Bass model determines the cumulative 
fraction of the target population that adopts each year.  
 
  





In KUSUM-C, the main farm incremental cost is the capital cost of the solar panel and pump, modified 
by the fractions of the cost (i) subsidized by the government and (ii) covered by a commercial loan. 
The repayment period of the loan is specified. Additional reoccurring costs arise due to maintenance 
of the solar panel and pump, especially after the end of the loan period, when insurance expires. 
 
Benefits derive from power savings from more efficient irrigation and surplus power generated over 
and above irrigation requirements, which can be either sold back to the grid or sold to neighbors. 
More efficient energy use is assumed due to the added incentive of a feed-in tariff and there are also 
chances that irrigation pumping demand might reduce. There is no evidence yet that farmers will 
invest in efficient irrigation – efficient irrigation technologies have been promoted through high 
government subsidies throughout India, but have received a rather lukewarm response. One major 
reason for this may be that farmers have never had any incentive to become efficient irrigators. SPaRC 
may provide that incentive. 
 
Sales of power or water to neighbors are considered synonymous and the distribution of water yield 
per unit of solar energy is used as a conversion factor between the two. The partitioning of power 
between sale of power to the grid or to neighbors is conditioned on the relative prices of the feed-in 
tariff and the price of selling power to neighbors. Savings due to adoption of solar for pumping are 
due to the fact that farmers will not have to pay electricity or diesel fuel bills. For example, farmers in 
Gujarat may consume around 800 kWh per horsepower (hp) per year and with an average load of 11 
hp, farmers pay around USD 80 every year in electricity bills.  
 
Farmers face various risks that may affect either adoption or income directly. KUSUM-C requires a 
well-established community structure to operate and where this is not in place then adoption may be 
reduced, and additional resources will be required to create such structures. Cooperatives are needed 
because (i) individual solar systems are very small and farmers are not expert enough to take care of 
maintenance issues; and (ii) when farmers form collectives, they can better explore buyers for their 
energy. Technical problems or theft can influence farmers’ perception of solar irrigation and reduce 
adoption.  
 
Adoption rates are dependent on the feed-in tariff. Increases in tariff increase adoption rate, while 
reduced tariff reduces adoption rate relative to the baseline. Increases in water pumping risk further 
drawing down water tables in groundwater-limited areas and the model simulates an increase in the 
cost of pumping each unit of water as a function of additional pumping. Various other factors may 
enable more rapid adoption, such as promotional campaigns and financial incentives. 
 
DISCOMs or local governments incur the cost of subsidizing the capital costs of solar pump systems 
and the execution costs associated with maintaining feeders. DISCOMs make savings from taking 
farmers off the grid through the reduced supply of subsidized power to farmers. They obtain 
Renewable Energy Credits for each kWh of solar energy generated by farmers. The energy that was 
earlier supplied to farmers at a loss can now service industrial and domestic consumers – both of 
which add to DISCOMs’ profits. DISCOMS also make savings as a result of a reduction in technical, 
distribution and commercial losses associated with providing power. For example, in Gujarat, 
reductions in transmission and distribution losses are as high as 40%. This benefit alone can finance 
KUSUM-C. 
 
The model allows water use to increase or decrease, depending on the price incentive to sell 
power/water to neighbors and the additional cost of water pumping due to water table drawdown. 
An ‘environmental’ water price is used to compute the environmental cost of water used. Reduction 
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in GHG emissions through adoption of solar uses whole-lifecycle benefits versus the use of fossil fuel 




In KUSUM-A, farmers do not incur costs. The benefits accrue from an increase in income due to more 
reliable power, having additional power available and the sale of power/water to neighbors. More 
reliable power can increase income by avoiding damaging periods with no access to electricity during 
power cuts or rationing.  
 
Under KUSUM-A, farmers might use additional power because they will not be limited to the amount 
of energy generated from a small number of panels on their farm, as would be the case in KUSUM-C. 
Instead of getting 8 hours of power during the day for 15 days, and 8 hours at night for the next 
fortnight, under KUSUM-A, they will have 8 hours of daytime power every day. There will not be lower 
discharges of power in morning and evening because the solar plant will be much larger than their 
own pump size, and so they will have access to unlimited power. Hence, shifting from 8 hours per 
day/night supply to 8 hours per day supply may result in an increase in farmers’ power consumption. 
In addition, solar plants will be located at substation level with a capacity of 2 to 10 MW at peak load. 
 
Farmers’ income risks include power disruptions due to DISCOMs not maintaining feeders; power 
rationing by DISCOMs; and overpumping. A lack of incentive for DISCOMs to maintain feeders can 
occur if DISCOMs are compensated by state governments for energy used by farmers. DISCOMs are 
also under constant pressure from local and state-level politicians not to penalize farmers for any 
wrongdoing. DISCOMs can therefore see farmers as a nuisance, rather than as paying and valued 
customers. Power rationing by DISCOMs interrupts irrigation schedules and can reduce income. 
Overpumping will increase water pumping costs in groundwater-limited areas, as explained above. 
Farmers may generally have negative perceptions of DISCOMs due to factors such as rationing during 
the peak irrigation season and slowness in repairing transformers during the peak season. However, 
with time under KUSUM-A, a positive perception may develop. Adoption enablers are the same as for 
KUSUM-C.  
 
DISCOMs incur costs due to extra power consumption by farmers having unlimited access to daytime 
power, resulting in increased consumption. Field studies have shown that off-grid solar pump owners 
pump more groundwater than their diesel and electric counterparts. DISCOMs have a benefit of 
reduced cost of supplying electricity in KUSUM-A due to (i) the feed-in-tariff for new solar plants being 
lower than the average power purchase cost for most electricity utilities; and (ii) savings on HT 
transmission losses due to distributed generation.  
 
A risk for DISCOMs with KUSUM-A is the unavailability of land for substations. The opportunity cost of 
land will be very high as most of the substations are located in suburban areas. Renting or purchasing 
land near to substations on the scale of 5 acres of land for each megawatt of peak power is also 
difficult. Renting government land is even more difficult as it would require clearance from several 
departments. This constraint could increase the cost of energy generation. 
 




All input variables and parameters are represented as probability distributions formulated from 
metalog distributions, where: 
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p0 = the minimum possible value.  
p10 = the lowest likely value. The value is unlikely to be lower than this value 10% of the time or 
in 10% of cases. 
p50 = the median value. The value that is most likely. 
p90 = the highest likely value. The value is unlikely to be higher than this value 10% of the time 
or in 10% of cases. 
p100 = the maximum possible value. 
 
The input variables are listed in Table 2 and the input values used are documented in the model which, 
together with the supporting literature and presentations, is available at:  
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/9a6r5u5tjm0s3hr/AAB0Kfw9ojKdZXaCwNJ40KqAa?dl=0.  
The total consultation time with experts was about 20 hours over six months, plus a workshop with 
experts from the IWMI-Tata Water Policy Research Program (ITP) and a virtual validation workshop 
with a wider set of stakeholders (see main report). Key experts were trained in probability estimation 
and reviewed the data input sheets and results. 
 
 
Table 3. List of model input variables. 
Adoption Definition (all are entered as probability distributions) 
Target population (no. of farmers) The number of farmers in the target area that have potential to 
adopt solar irrigation 
Farm size (ha) Farm size of irrigation farmers 
Bass p value Coefficient in the Bass adoption model that determines the initial 
rate of adoption by innovators. The Bass model determines the 
fraction of the target population that adopts each year 
Bass q value Coefficient in the Bass adoption model that determines the rate 
of adoption by imitators 
 
KUSUM C  
Farmer incremental costs KUSUM-C  
Pump load size (kW) Pump capacity expressed as load 
Oversizing ratio Rated capacity of the solar panel array (kW peak) divided by the 
rated pump capacity (kW) 
Pump + solar panel price per unit 
oversized adjusted load (USD/kW) 
Price (USD) of solar panel + pump expressed per unit of oversized 
adjusted load (kW) 
Subsidy fraction of initial investment Fraction of the initial investment in solar panel/pump that is 
subsidized 
Commercial loan fraction of initial 
investment 
Fraction of the initial investment in solar panel/pump that is 
provided via a commercial loan 
Loan repayment period (years) Repayment period for the commercial loan 
Additional reoccurring costs (USD) Additional reoccurring costs associated with maintenance of solar 
panel and pump 
 
Farmer incremental income KUSUM-C  
Power equivalent used for normal 
irrigation (kWh/yr) 
Amount of power used for normal irrigation practices on a farm 
Excess solar power generated 
(kWh/yr) 
Solar power generated in excess of normal irrigation needs 
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Fraction of power saved due to more 
efficient irrigation 
Fraction of power normally used for irrigation that is saved due to 
more efficient irrigation with solar pumping 
Water yield per unit energy (m3/kWh) Conversion factor used to convert water pumped per unit energy 
Water price (USD/m3) Environmental price of water, used to place an environmental 
value on water use 
Electricity sale price back to grid 
(USD/kWh) 
Tariff price for sale of power back to the grid 
Irrigation sale price neighbors 
(USD/kWh) 
Price gained for sale of water to neighbors, expressed per unit of 
equivalent energy required for pumping 
Savings due to adoption of solar for 
pumping (USD/yr) 
Savings from using solar instead of diesel or electric pumps 
Increase in income due to more 
reliable/convenient power (USD/yr) 
Increase in income due to more reliable power from having own 
solar source (e.g., from more timely irrigation compared with 
periods of power outages) 
 
Farmer income risks KUSUM-C  
Overpumping risk coefficient Coefficient that determines the shape of the relationship between 
the cost of pumping and the amount of additional water pumped, 
reflecting increased pumping costs as a result of water table 
drawdown in dry areas 
 
Adoption risks KUSUM-C (0–1 scale; 0 
= no risk) 
 
Lack of community structure  Adoption risk factor due to risk of lack of existing community 
structures, which makes it more difficult for adoption to occur 
Technical problems or theft become 
common 
Risk factor for technical problems or theft as a disincentive for 
other farmers to adopt 
 
Research/policy intervention impacts 
on adoption KUSUM-C 
 
Promotion multiplier (communication, 
demonstration, policy) 
Adoption multiplier (>1) that fractionally increments adoption 
rate due to efforts that promote adoption, such as 
communication, demonstration or policy interventions 
Financing multiplier (private sector 
aggregators/ government incentives)  
Adoption multiplier that fractionally increments adoption rate 
due to provision of financial incentives 
 
DISCOM + government costs KUSUM-
C 
 
Solar pump subsidy fraction 
contributed by central government 
Fraction of the solar panel/pump cost that is borne by 
government 
Execution cost (% of capex) Cost of maintaining solar power systems (e.g., feeders) that allow 
buy-back of power to the grid, expressed as a percentage of 
capital expenditure on their establishment 
 
 
DISCOM + government benefits 
KUSUM-C 
 
Savings from farmers taken off the grid 
due to direct subsidy (USD/farmer/yr) 
Amount of savings that DISCOMs realize due to reduced supply of 
subsidized power 
Reduction in losses due to 
implementation of KUSUM-C 
(USD/farmer/yr) 
Amount of savings that DISCOMs realize due to reduction in 
technical, distribution and commercial losses  
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DISCOM + government risks KUSUM-C  
None No costs were factored 
 
KUSUM-A  
Farmer costs KUSUM-A  
None No costs were factored 
 
Farmer income KUSUM-A  
Power equivalent used for normal 
irrigation (kWh/yr) 
Amount of power used for normal irrigation practices on a farm 
Increase in income due to more 
reliable/convenient power (USD/yr) 
Increase in income due to having more reliable power from own 
solar source (e.g., from more timely irrigation compared with 
periods of power outages) 
Extra grid power used (kWh/yr) Additional (excess) grid power used, over and above power used 
for normal irrigation 
Fraction of excess power used for 
pumping 
Fraction of the excess power generated that is used for pumping 
water 
Water yield per unit energy (m3/kWh) Conversion factor used to convert water pumped per unit energy 
Water price for additional water used 
(USD/m3) 
Environmental price of water, used to place an environmental 
value on water use 
 
Farmer income risks KUSUM-A (0–1 
scale; 0 = no risk) 
 
Lack of incentive to maintain feeders 
reduces benefit of reliable power 
Risk factor that reduces income due to DISCOMs not maintaining 
feeders, resulting in unreliable power 
Power rationing by DISCOMs Risk factor that reduces income due to rationing of power by 
DISCOMs 
Overpumping risk coefficient Coefficient that determines the shape of the relationship between 
cost of pumping and the amount of additional water pumped, 
reflecting increased pumping costs as a result of water table 
drawdown in dry areas 
 
Adoption risks KUSUM-A (0–1 scale; 0 
= no risk)  
 
Farmers’ negative perception of 
DISCOMs reduces adoption 
Risk factor that reduces adoption in response to farmers’ negative 
perception of DISCOMs, e.g., due to non- or late payments 
 
Research/policy intervention impacts 
on adoption KUSUM-A 
 
Promotion multiplier (communication, 
demonstration, policy) 
Adoption multiplier (>1) that fractionally increments adoption 
rate due to efforts that promote adoption, such as 
communication, demonstration or policy interventions 
Financing multiplier (private sector 
aggregators/ government incentives)  
Adoption multiplier that fractionally increments adoption rate 
due to provision of financial incentives 
 
DISCOM + government costs KUSUM-
A 
 
Increase in supply cost due to extra 
consumption by farmers 
(USD/farmer/yr) 
Additional cost to DISCOMs resulting from extra consumption of 
power by farmers when using solar irrigation 
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Execution cost (USD/farmer/yr) Costs of execution and land lease 
  
DISCOM + government net benefits 
KUSUM-A 
 
Reduced cost of supplying electricity 
due to solar (USD/farmer/yr) 
Savings due to reduced cost of supplying electricity from solar 
sources 
 
DISCOM + government risks KUSUM-
A (0–1 scale; 0 = no risk) 
 
Land unavailable for solar plants 
reduces adoption 
Risk factor reducing adoption due to scarcity of land available for 





KUSUM-C and KUSUM-A  
 
Environmental benefit  
Reduction in GHG emissions from solar 
adoption (t CO2eq/kWh) 
Whole-lifecycle reduction in GHG emissions as a result of using 
solar versus fossil fuel energy sources 
Carbon price (USD/t CO2eq) Carbon price per unit of CO2 equivalent 
 
Financial  





All model outputs are calculated as probability distributions and stored as SIPs with 1000 Monte Carlo 
trials. Results are summarized as expected values (EV), the 10th and 90th percentiles, or cumulative 
probability curves. A dashboard is available that allows users to enter p10, p50 and p90 values of 
selected variables and interactively view changes in key metrics graphically. This provides for 





The simulations using the input distributions for the baseline situation projected that, on average, 
about 72% of the target population would have adopted solar irrigation by 2040 (Figure 3). KUSUM-C 
accounted for about 61% of adopters, while KUSUM-A accounted for 39% of adopters. This higher 
adoption of KUSUM-C is largely driven by its increased profitability compared with KUSUM-A. 
However, there was large uncertainty around these expected values due to the wide range of Bass p 
and q parameters used. There is currently little data with which to calibrate the Bass parameters and 





Figure 3. Expected values of the time course of the cumulative adoption fraction of the target 
population for KUSUM-C, KUSUM-A and their total. 
 
 
Net Present Value 
 
Net present values (NPVs) at different levels of aggregation at year 2040 are shown in Table 4. 
Expected values of farm-level NPV are over 10 times greater for KUSUM-C than KUSUM-A. The high 
net income in KUSUM-C is driven by sale of power back to the grid (about two-thirds of the income on 
average) and savings due to adoption of solar (about one-third of the income on average). The higher 
aggregated NPV for KUSUM-C reflects the higher farm income and the higher adoption rate. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of net present values (NPV) in USD in 2040 at different levels of aggregation. 
The expected value (EV) and the 10th and 90th percentile values are shown. Units of millions are 
denoted with ‘m’. Greenhouse gas (GHG) benefits are included. 
 Net present value (USD) 
Level 
NPV 10th 
percentile NPV EV 
NPV 90th 
percentile 
Farm KUSUM-C 1,720 13,332 28,938 
Farm KUSUM-A 431 1,137 2,128 
Aggregated KUSUM-C -1 m 3,358 m 10,184 m 
Aggregated KUSUM-A 1 m 183 m 463 m 
Aggregated all 1 m 3,541 m 10,454 m 
DISCOM KUSUM-C -138 m 1,014 m 3,086 m 
DISCOM KUSUM-A -353 m -65 m 146 m 
DISCOM all -263 m 949 m 3,047 m 
Water KUSUM-C 0 m 92 m 248 m 
Water KUSUM-A -327 m -125 m 0 m 
GHG KUSUM-C 1,046 m 1,032,194 m 2,352,328 m 
GHG KUSUM-A 549 m 307,003 m 806,512 m 
Environ all 2,202 m 1,339,163 m 3,235,047 m 












0 5 10 15 20
Year
Cumulative adoption fraction
All Avg KUSUM-A Avg KUSUM-C Avg
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The farm-level distribution of NPV is much wider in KUSUM-C than KUSUM-A and there is a 5% chance 
of making a loss in KUSUM-C (Figure 4) due to combinations of lower income and higher discount rates 
in some trials. However, there is a large upside tail on KUSUM-C, with a 10% chance of obtaining over 
USD 30,000/ha discounted net benefit over 20 years. Further disaggregation of the downsides and 
upsides is warranted and would provide pointers to which policies may increase opportunities and 
reduce risks. 
 




NPV for DISCOMs plus local government (abbreviated to DISCOMs) has a positive expected value for 
KUSUM-C but negative for KUSUM-A (Table 4). There is a 27% chance of loss for DISCOMs with 
KUSUM-C compared with 67% in KUSUM-A and a large upside opportunity in KUSUM-C, largely 
determined by variation in the size of the savings from taking farmers off the grid (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative probability distributions of NPV for DISCOMs plus local government in 
KUSUM-C and KUSUM-A. 
 
 
KUSUM-C saves water on average (Table 4) and there is no chance of an increase in water use using 
the default data inputs (Figure 6), whereas KUSUM-A has a 90% chance of increasing water use. The 
former is due to more efficient irrigation in KUSUM-C and the incentive to sell power to the grid as 
opposed to increased pumping for sale of water to neighbors. 
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Reductions in GHG emissions are massive (Table 4), at over one trillion USD (long form) on average in 
KUSUM-C and one-third of this amount in KUSUM-A. Emissions are calculated using whole-lifecycle 
emission reductions with solar compared with fossil fuel power, and using a distribution of carbon 
prices based on the State and Trends of Carbon Pricing published by the World Bank (2019). 
Accounting for GHG benefits, either solar irrigation scheme gives little chance (0.5%) of loss at the 
project level and gives a return on investment (ROI) of over 122,000%. Given the current lack of GHG 
payment mechanisms, an option is included to omit GHG benefits, which then gives a project-level 
average ROI of 349% with a 15% chance of loss. Further investigation is warranted into what 




Stochastic sensitivity analysis was conducted by sequentially changing groups of variables to their 10th 
and 90th percentile values, with all other variables left as stochastic. The results are displayed as a 
Tornado diagram, which shows the change in project-level NPV relative to its expected value as a 
result of changing the target group of variables to their 10th or 90th percentile values.  
 
When GHG benefits are included (Figure 7), variation in project NPV is dominated by the variation in 
environmental benefits. Results are also sensitive to adoption parameters and the farm-level benefits 
of KUSUM-C, especially on their upside. NPV was also sensitive to discount rate, which ranged from 
5% to 15%. 
 
When GHG benefits are excluded (Figure 8), NPV is no longer sensitive to environmental benefits, and 
sensitivity is dominated by the upside of farm-level benefits for KUSUM-C, with the downside of 
KUSUM-C costs also playing in. Adoption factors remain as an important influence. More detailed 





Figure 7. Stochastic sensitivity analysis of different variable groups displayed as a Tornado diagram 
when greenhouse gas benefits are included. The diagram shows the change in project NPV when a 




Adoption = Adoption factors; FarmCostC = Farm costs for KUSUM-C; FarmIncC = Farm income benefits for KUSUM-C; 
FarmRisksC = Farm risk factors for KUSUM-C; DiscomC = DISCOM + local government costs, benefits and risks for KUSUM-C; 
FarmIncA = Farm income benefits for KUSUM-A; FarmRisksA = Farm risk factors for KUSUM-A; DiscomA = DISCOM + local 
government costs, benefits and risks for KUSUM-A; DiscRate = Discount rate. Note there are no Farm costs for KUSUM-A. 
 
 
Figure 8. Stochastic sensitivity analysis of different variable groups displayed as a Tornado diagram 
when greenhouse gas benefits are excluded. The diagram shows the change in project NPV when a 
group of variables is set to its 10th percentile values (blue bars) or its 90th percentile values (orange 
bars). 
 
Adoption = Adoption factors; FarmCostC = Farm costs for KUSUM-C; FarmIncC = Farm income benefits for KUSUM-C; 
FarmRisksC = Farm risk factors for KUSUM-C; DiscomC = DISCOM + local government costs, benefits and risks for KUSUM-C; 
FarmIncA = Farm income benefits for KUSUM-A; FarmRisksA = Farm risk factors for KUSUM-A; DiscomA = DISCOM + local 




NPVs were presented in Table 4. In this section the results for additional indicators at Year 20 are 
presented (Table 5). The wide (100-fold) range in the number of adopters reflects the wide range in 
the Bass model adoption parameters, which span the global range of adoption rates for photovoltaic 
technology. At the farm level, KUSUM-C incurs a small chance of loss, as previously described, whereas 
KUSUM-A has no chance of loss. Consequently, the number of farmers profiting is 97% of adopters on 
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average. The wide range in irrigated area reflects the wide range of adoption rates and its distribution 
between KUSUM-C and KUSUM-A.  
 
There are opportunities for moderate water savings (farm water use of -14,300 m3/yr on average) with 
KUSUM-C, even at the 90th percentile, compared with increased water use in KUSUM-A (40,000 m3/yr 
on average). The project-level ROI is very large on average, even without considering GHG benefits, 
but is slightly negative at the 10th percentile. Including GHG benefits, the ROI is extremely high at all 
levels of probability. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of values of additional indicators in 2040. The expected value (EV) and the 
10th and 90th percentile values are shown.  
Indicator 10 percentile EV 90 percentile  
Target population (number of farmers) 804,469 997,505 1,193,770  
Adopters KUSUM-C 7,704 439,940 828,491  
Adopters KUSUM-A 4,861 268,260 567,569  
Adopters total 13,594 708,201 1,139,426  
Chance of farm-level loss KUSUM-C - 5% -  
Chance of farm-level loss KUSUM-A - 0% -  
Number of farmers profiting - 687,963 -  
Irrigated area KUSUM-C (ha) 7,732 476,093 1,116,923  
Irrigated area KUSUM-A (ha) 5,100 292,575 705,821  
Irrigated area total (ha) 13,671 768,668 1,737,344  
Change in farm water use KUSUM-C (m3/yr) -35,087 -14,272 -1,342  
Change in farm water use KUSUM-A (m3/yr) 9,304 40,039 74,914  
Return on investment without GHGs (%) -29 349 882  




Several scenarios are simulated, identified by experts and through stakeholder workshops as of 
importance for policy decision making and supporting research. The choice of scenarios was also 




The Bass adoption model p and q parameters were allowed to vary widely, covering the range 
reported from a global review of photovoltaic adoption studies across 10 countries (Yang et al. 2018). 
Reducing the Bass model innovation parameter, p, to low (10th percentile value) delayed pick-up in 
adoption until after Year 10 (Figure 9b) compared with the base case when all parameters are left as 
stochastic (Figure 9a). When the mimicking parameter, q, is set to low, there is a slow, steady increase 
in adoption. When both p and q parameters are set to low, there is virtually no adoption over the 20 




Figure 9. Response of cumulative adoption fraction over time (a) for the base case, and (b) with the 
Bass model p parameter at its 10th percentile value and (c) with the Bass model q parameter at its 
10th percentile. 
                          (a)                                                     (b)                                                         (c) 
   
 
When either the Bass p or q parameters are set to high (90th percentile values), then almost complete 
(100%) adoption occurs at 20 years (Figure 10b, 10c). When both p and q parameters are set to high, 
then complete adoption occurs by Year 5. Further research on adoption rates of solar technology in 
Asian countries is warranted to reduce the uncertainty on expected adoption rates. 
 
Figure 10. Response of cumulative adoption fraction over time (a) for the base case, and (b) with 
the Bass model p parameter at its 90th percentile value and (c) with the Bass model q parameter at 
its 90th percentile. 
                            (a)                                                      (b)                                                       (c) 
    
 
Subsidies and loans 
 
Currently, the capital cost of solar pumping equipment (solar panel and pump) in KUSUM-C is 
subsidized for farmers by both central government (30%) and local government (30%). The remaining 
40% of the capital cost is taken as a loan by farmers from local banks over a period of six years. The 
profitability and adoption of KUSUM-C may be strongly influenced by the amount of subsidy and the 
loan period. 
 
When subsidy is completely removed (Figure 11b), overall adoption of solar irrigation is reduced by 
only about 10% by Year 20 compared with the base case (Figure 11a); adoption of KUSUM-C drops to 
a low level and adoption is dominated by KUSUM-A. This lower adoption of KUSUM-C is driven by the 
lower farm-level profitability, with expected NPV reducing from USD 13,500 to USD 8,000. The switch 
in adoption comes with a project-level environmental cost, increasing on average from USD 32 million 
in the base case to USD 149 million when subsidy is removed. This is due to reduction in water savings 
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in KUSUM-C (-14,300 m3/year) combined with increases in water use in KUSUM-A (40,000 m3/year), 
and increased GHG emissions in KUSUM-A compared with KUSUM-C (Table 5). These translate into an 
increase in risk of loss at the project level, from 15% in the base case to 30% without subsidy. However, 
if farmers are able to take a 100% loan over 10 years, the average adoption dynamics are almost 
restored to those of the base case (Figure 11c).  
 
Figure 11. Response of cumulative adoption fraction over time (a) for the base case, and (b) with 
removal of subsidy and (c) removal of subsidy and increase in loan to 100% of capital cost over a 
period of 10 years. 
 
(a)                                                   (b)                                                        (c) 




Varying tariff prices for the sale of power back to the grid is considered a key policy lever. The value 
of the sale of water to neighbors is also important as it can provide an incentive to use power to pump 
more water to sell as opposed to selling the power back to the grid. The balance in prices is likely to 
determine farmers’ behavior. There is also large variation in the pricing of water for sale to neighbors: 
in some areas where high-value crops are grown, water prices may be high, but in other areas there 
is no demand for water purchasing.  
 
Adoption is not very sensitive to variation in tariff, although at a very low tariff the adoption rate of 
KUSUM-C converges to that of KUSUM-A (Figure 12b). However, farm water use in KUSUM-C switches 
from an average water saving of about 14,300 m3/year in the base case to an increase in water use of 
about 19,600 m3/year with very low tariff (Figure 13a, 13b). A high tariff slightly increases the adoption 
rate of KUSUM-C relative to the base case.  
 
When the price for selling power to neighbors is set to zero, water savings in KUSUM-C increase to 
33,700 m3/year, more than double the water saving of the base case. An extreme scenario of no selling 
of power to neighbors produces an environmental benefit of USD 64 million compared with an 




Figure 12. Response of cumulative adoption fraction over time (a) for the base case, and (b) with a 
very low tariff (INR 1.2/kWh) and (c) a high tariff (INR 4.6/kWh). 
(a)                                                      (b)                                                      (c) 
   
 
Figure 13. Response of farm-level water use (a) for the base case, and (b) with a low tariff (INR 
1.2/kWh) and (c) with the base case tariff (INR 3.8/kWh) and zero price for selling power (water) to 
neighbors. 
(a)                          (b)                                                (c) 
   
 
 
Capacity to support KUSUM-C 
 
KUSUM-C requires a high level of community organization and competent local facilitating agencies 
to support its communication and roll-out. In Gujarat, there is already a high level of community 
organization from milk cooperatives and KUSUM-C has had a high level of promotion. However, in 
other states these structures may be less advanced and present an obstacle to the adoption of 
KUSUM-C. We would expect the adoption q factor to be reduced where there is less structure, which 
would result in a tendency towards the adoption pattern shown in Figure 9b, with a slow initial phase 
before adoption picks up. The length of the lag phase would be proportional to the time it takes to 







Risk of non-payment by DISCOMs 
 
The risk of non-payment by DISCOMs in KUSUM-C was raised by stakeholders as a significant risk. This 
would reduce the confidence of both farmers and banks and result in reduced bank lending. Reduced 
lending would favor adoption of KUSUM-A over KUSUM-C. If loans were unavailable, the simulations 
show an average adoption fraction at Year 20 of 0.4 in KUSUM-A versus 0.19 in KUSUM-C. This would 
increase water use and the chance of a project-level loss as shown in the scenario of reduced tariff. 
 
Availability of land for KUSUM-A 
 
A risk to the adoption of KUSUM-A is the difficulty DISCOMs may encounter in acquiring land for the 
solar banks. In cases where this risk is enhanced, the outcome is a lowering of the Bass model initiation 
parameter, q, which results in a tendency towards the adoption pattern in Figure 9b. 
 
Low existing groundwater levels 
 
In areas where existing groundwater levels are low, there may be large policy and farmer resistance 
to the adoption of solar irrigation due to the perception of increased groundwater depletion. Our 
simulations show potential for KUSUM-C to reduce water use, especially where feed-in tariffs are 
higher than the price of selling power to neighbors; in contrast, KUSUM-A is likely to increase water 
use. Therefore, the adoption of solar irrigation will depend heavily on communicating the benefits of 
KUSUM-C and ensuring supporting policies are put in place to favor its adoption. 
 
Proposal to provide daytime power 
 
There have been local government proposals to provide daytime power to farmers. This may disfavor 
adoption of KUSUM-C by taking away the benefit of more reliable power offered by KUSUM-C. 
However, generating power on-farm is always going to be more reliable than depending on any grid 
supply, even with the promise of daytime power. Perhaps more prominently, a daytime power 
alternative may make the transaction cost of community building and communication with KUSUM-C 
more pronounced. 
 
With a daytime power scheme, farmers will need more convincing of the benefit of KUSUM-C and this 
may be reflected in a slower adoption rate for KUSUM-C (e.g., Figure 9b). The success of KUSUM-C will 
depend largely on how beneficial farmers perceive it to be.  
  
However, giving all farmers daytime grid power may be difficult, and costly. DISCOM operations are 
most efficient if their ‘load curve’ is flat (i.e., constant demand for electricity throughout the day and 
year). The best way to achieve a near-flat load curve is to schedule power supply to farmers when 
nobody else wants it. With providing daytime power to farmers, this will become very difficult to 
achieve, unless there is a very rapid increase in solar generation capacity. Such a policy decision would 






The simulations point to several implications for policy. Solar irrigation in general (whether KUSUM-C 
or KUSUM-A) provides the following expected values and risks by 2040 compared with non-solar 
alternatives, although the sizes of the value and risks vary according to the model or mixture of 
models: 
 
• Increased farm income (USD 1,000 to USD 13,000 per farm); 
• Water savings or increased water use at farm level depending on the model (saving of 14,300 
m3/yr to increased use of 40,000 m3/yr); 
• GHG benefits (USD 310,000 million to USD 1,030,000 million at project level); 
• Chance of loss of 0 to 5% at farm level and 27% to 67% for DISCOMs + local government. 
 
Therefore, while farm income and GHG reduction benefits are universal, the profitability for DISCOMs 
(including local government) and impacts on water use are strongly dependent on the model that is 
implemented. The above projections are expected, or average, values and there is a wide range in 
possible values, which must be taken into account and are an area for further policy research.  
 
The differences in expected value and risks of KUSUM-C compared with KUSUM-A at 2040 are 
summarized in Table 6. Substantive increases in farm income and water savings only occur with 
KUSUM-C. However, as seen in the scenario analysis, these benefits are conditional on maintaining 
subsidies, or compensating for them through more favorable loan support, and maintaining tariffs for 
the sale of power to the grid. KUSUM-C is also a more attractive proposition to DISCOMs providing 
that mechanisms are found for providing the necessary level of institutional support. GHG benefits 
are three times higher in KUSUM-C compared with KUSUM-A. 
 
There is some debate on the future trends in tariff prices and whether providers will incur a cost of 
subsidizing these if prices fall when they have provided a 25-year guaranteed tariff under a power 
purchase agreement. The scenario analysis shows that a low buy-back tariff will not incentivize 
farmers to reduce groundwater pumping and KUSUM-A and KUSUM-C will be more similar in terms 
of the lack of incentives for saving groundwater. On the other hand, if the government decides that, 
in the interest of reducing groundwater pumping, farmers will continue to get a higher buy-back tariff, 
then the subsidy burden on DISCOMs/state government/ministry (whoever pays the buy back) will 
increase and could perhaps negate the main purported benefit for DISCOMs. However, on the other 
hand, the savings for DISCOMs are much higher than just the cost of buying power and may far 
outweigh the cost of tariff subsidy. In addition, if tariff prices did go down, then farmers could come 
together as an independent power producer and sell power to the commercial sector, becoming 
competitors to the DISCOMs. For example, dairy plants in Gujarat are already considering investing in 
solar power to meet their energy needs and could contract farmer cooperatives to supply their power. 
 
Table 6. Summary of values and risks for KUSUM-C versus KUSUM-A. NPV values are for Year 2040. 
Values are rounded; units of millions are denoted with ‘m’. 
Value KUSUM-C KUSUM-A 
Additional farm net income (NPV) USD 13,500 USD 1,000 
Chance of income loss at farm level (%) 5 0 
Change in water use at farm level (m3/farm/yr) -14,300 40,000 
DISCOM + local government net income (NPV USD ) USD 1,000 m -USD 60 m 
Chance of income loss for DISCOM + local 
government (%) 
27 67 
GHG discounted benefits (USD ) USD 1,032,000 m USD 307,000 m 
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KUSUM C is likely to face the strongest competition from KUSUM A when:  
• Subsidies are decreased or removed; 
• Loans are decreased; 
• Tariff prices are reduced; 
• Demand and price are high for buying water (e.g., cash crops); 
• Non-payment by DISCOMs becomes prevalent; 
• Groundwater is not limiting; 
• Local institutions are weak; 
• Land for solar banks is available; 
• Daytime power is made available. 
 
Priorities for further research and monitoring 
 
The simulation results point to several areas where further research would have high value for 
improving estimates of solar irrigation benefits and for supporting its adoption and favorable 
outcomes: 
 
1. Further literature review to narrow the Bass model parameter estimates using data for similar 
technology and regional situations. 
2. India-wide research on causal factors determining tariff prices and incentives for selling water to 
neighbors. 
3. Institutional mechanisms for supporting the adoption of KUSUM-C. For example, on which types 
of local institutions could be supported by local governments to build farm communities, liaise 
with DISCOMs and communicate potential KUSUM-C benefits. 
4. Policy advocacy and communication strategies for conveying the potential income-water-energy 
benefits of KUSUM-C and conditions for its success to farmers, local government, DISCOMs and 
central government. 
5. Factors that could reduce risks and enhance benefits for DISCOMs. 
6. How to realize and distribute the GHG emission reduction benefits of solar power through 
payment or incentive schemes. Better estimates of how much fossil fuel solar irrigation is 
displacing versus other solar alternatives. 
7. Run the model for other Indian states or diverse situations by adjusting values in the model input 
sheet and checking assumptions hold up in other states. Areas where there is groundwater stress 
and a weak history of community structures, in contrast to Gujarat, would be high-priority 
candidates. 
8. Update the model to include any additional assumptions or comparisons that are of interest to 
researchers or policy makers, such as inclusion of a KUSUM-B/C hybrid, i.e., standalone microgrids 
in which surplus power is put to productive and paid use.  
 
There was an additional suggestion to include in the model the social gain created through buying-
back power from farmers instead of developers. This could be done by thinking through what tangible 
benefits would be observed if there was social gain or not. 
 
Priorities for monitoring include: 
 
1. Adoption rates of different solar irrigation models and associated factors; 
2. Trends in subsidies and loans; 
3. Tariff prices and water sale prevalence and pricing; 
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4. Additional farm incomes actually achieved, and water use patterns with solar irrigation. For 
example, case-control studies could be envisaged; 
5. Types of local institutions supporting KUSUM-C and criteria for success; 
6. Introduction of policies that could change incentives for the adoption of KUSUM-C and/or 
KUSUM-A (e.g., provision of daytime power). 
 
Adoption rate is the overriding uncertainty determining outcomes in the model and therefore has the 
highest value for further research and monitoring, both to narrow the uncertainty and to validate the 
causal factors affecting adoption. Of second priority are KUSUM-C benefits, especially factors that 
favor the upside opportunities for obtaining high farm income and large water savings, and actions 
that could further minimize the chance of loss. Of third priority is to better establish how to reduce 




The simulation model is intended to serve as a learning tool for researchers and policy makers. A 
simulation model dashboard is provided to make it easy for non-specialists to change values of key 
input variables (e.g., to low, 10th percentile; medium, 50th percentile; or high, 90th percentile levels, or 
more extreme levels) and immediately observe the response of outcome variables in graphical form 
(Figure 14). The model’s data input sheet is on a separate, linked worksheet to facilitate use and 
contains fields for documenting data sources.  
 
Ideally, ownership of the model would be taken over by an institution that could maintain, use and 
further develop it (see Recommendation 3 in the main report). Of particular interest is the potential 
to work with policy makers to show scenarios and results and help develop a better understanding of 
the benefits and trade-offs with alternative solar irrigation models. ITP has been proposed as one 
potential candidate for a hosting institution. Some financial and technical backstopping support may 
be required initially to make this happen and may be considered by WLE. 
 
Figure 14. Model dashboard display, which allows users to visualize results interactively as values 




A CGIAR enterprise platform for risk management 
 
Data or information from applied research have no value unless they improve decision making. For 
example, decisions on what interventions should be promoted to provide the most favorable 
livelihood and environmental outcomes at least cost and risk. It is impossible to know what research 
will produce value without first quantifying the current state of uncertainty and then seeing which 
uncertainties are critical for outcomes. There is also strong demand from donors and other 
stakeholders for CGIAR to project and monitor benefits.  
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The CGIAR Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Community of Practice (MEL) has shown interest in 
the decision analysis and modeling approach used in this study as an input to ‘projected benefits’ of 
CGIAR initiatives. The SIPmathTM open-standard approach used in this study could provide the 
foundation for a CGIAR enterprise-wide platform for representing uncertainty and including 
uncertainty and risk in cost-benefit analysis. SIPmathTM is readily accessible to everyone in Excel but is 
also applicable across platforms (e.g., R, Python). We therefore recommend this approach for 
consideration as a CGIAR-wide complement in ex-ante and ex-post impact evaluations, and for use in 
research project screening at various stage gates, based on projected benefits with increasing detail 
at each stage gate. WLE might share the results of this study with MEL and discuss its potential wider 




The simulations have indicated that promotion of solar-powered irrigation using KUSUM-C is a good 
decision in Gujarat State. Compared with non-solar alternatives, KUSUM-C has potential to 
substantially increase farm profits with low risk, reduce water use and substantially reduce GHG 
emissions, while providing an opportunity for DISCOMs and local government to profit. There are 
significant upside opportunities for farmers to profit. 
 
However, the benefits of KUSUM-C are strongly conditional on the maintenance of government 
subsidies, the availability of farmer loans and the presence of strong local community-based 
organizations and facilitators. Compared with KUSUM-C, promotion of KUSUM-A provides moderate 
GHG benefits but provides a lower level of net benefit to farmers, increases water use and poses a 
higher risk of DISCOMs and local government making a loss. KUSUM-A is more appropriate for areas 
with plentiful groundwater resources.  
 
Adoption is projected to be higher with KUSUM-C than KUSUM-A under current conditions in Gujarat, 
but this situation would flip if subsidies were reduced or removed. The combined adoption of KUSAM-
A and KUSAM-C is projected to benefit about 1 million farm families by 2040 and increase income for 
97% of them. However, overall water use is expected to increase unless adoption is restricted to 
KUSUM-C only. 
 
A number of priorities are identified for further research and monitoring, targeted at areas of greatest 
uncertainty and largest effect on outcomes. Recommendations are made for further application, 
maintenance and improvement of the model as a research and policy learning tool. These include (i) 
assisting ITP to take ownership of the model and (ii) the adoption of risk-return analysis, aided by 
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